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REMEDIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES FOR
PRIVATE PROPERTY USED OR TAKEN
RICHARD W. VITARIS*t
INTRODUCTION
A suit against the government for compensation for property
used or taken is full of pitfalls. A case sounding in tort may be
brought only before a United States district court and is subject to
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).' If the case sounds in contract,
it generally' must be brought before the Court of Claims and is sub-
ject to the Tucker Act.3 In other cases the government action giving
rise to the suit is a taking within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment and the law of eminent domain governs. Finally, the govern-
ment action might amount to unjust enrichment under the law of
restitution. Theoretically, there is no remedy against the govern-
ment for unjust enrichment.' Often, however, a claim in unjust
enrichment may be brought under one of the alternative theories
discussed above.5 This article will discuss the differences and
similarities in the contract, tort, and eminent domain claims which
may be brought against the United States for the use or taking of
private property. Many claims for unjust enrichment are in fact
cognizable under one of these alternative theories, and an analytical
framework for approaching problems in this area will be developed.
I. TORT CLAIMS
Prior to the enactment of the FTCA in 1946, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity posed an insurmountable obstacle to suit
* Attorney with the United States Army Judge Advocate General's Corps,
Washington, D.C.
t The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of the Judge Advocate General or any governmental agency.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) et seq. (1976).
2. See note 27 infra.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 et seq. (1976).
4. See Alabama v. United States, 282 U.S. 502 (1931); United States v. Min-
nesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212 (1926). See generally Wall and Childres, The Law of
Restitution and the Federal Government, 66 Nw. L. REV. 587 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Restitution & Federal Government]. The rationale for not including implied in law con-
tracts within the jursidiction of the Tucker Act stems from the view that an implied in
law contract is not a true contract, so that a claim thereunder is not a contract claim.
See Kenner, Quasi-Contract, It's Nature and Scope, 7 HARV. L. REV. 57, 59 (1893).
5. See Restitution & Federal Government, supra note 4, at 600.
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against the United States in tort.6 Under the FTCA the United
States may be sued in federal district court without regard to
amount. There are, however, a variety of claims which are disallow-
ed under the FTCA. The FTCA allows recovery
for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occured.'
Thus, when analyzing any potential tort claim, the threshold
question must be whether the plaintiff has a cause of action in tort
under state law. If so, the plaintiff must consider whether his case
falls within one of the statutory exceptions to suit against the
United States. Unfortunately, many claims arising against the
government for the use or taking of private property fall within
these exceptions. The most common exceptions affecting these suits
include:
(1) claims based on the acts of federal employees, exer-
cising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation;8
(2) claims based on performance of some discretionary
function, or duty, without regard for whether the discre-
tion was abused;9 and
(3) claims arising out of interference with contract
rights."°
If a tort claim cannot be brought under the FTCA, the plaintiff
should consider whether the governmental action constitutes a tak-
ing under the fifth amendment. Where a government employee is act-
ing in the execution of a statute or regulation, the FTCA bars suit
in tort." That statute, however, might be construed as an exercise
of federal eminent domain."
6. Id. at 587-91.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1976).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)(1976).
9. Id.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)(1976).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)(1976).
12. See note 69 infra and accompanying text.
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At common law, the same transaction might give rise to a tort
claim and a claim in unjust enrichment, thus giving the plaintiff a
choice of remedies.'" The plaintiff would generally make his election
based on the difference in remedies. For example, the benefit to the
taker might exceed the damage to the owner, and in such a case the
typical plaintiff would waive the tort and sue in restitution." When
the defendant is the United States, however, this option generally is
not available. 5 This is because the United States has never waived
sovereign immunity for suits in unjust enrichment." While many
claims in unjust enrichment may be vindicated through a tort claim,
this is not so in every case. First, the conduct of the United States
is not necessarily tortious in every instance where the nation is un-
justly enriched." Second, there are many occasions where a tort
claim will be barred under the FTCA, thus making it impossible to
bring the restitution claim and sue in tort. 8 In these circumstances,
the claimant should consider whether the facts sounding in unjust
enrichment give rise to a claim in eminent domain.' This will be
possible only where there was an intentional tort since there is no
taking under the fifth amendment unless there is an intent on the
part of the condemnor to take the condemnee's property, or an in-
tent to do an act the natural consequence of which is to take the
property.20
13. There are some limits to the ability of a plaintiff to waive a tort and sue
in restitution. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 239 (1973)[hereinafter
cited as DOBBS]; Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suits in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221
(1910).
14. Friedman, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of
Property on the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 505 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Freidman, Restitution].
15. Note that if the facts constitute an implied in fact contract, given the ex-
panded meaning which the Court of Claims has given to that concept, see notes 40-49
infra and accompanying text, then the plaintiff may be able to make an election of
remedies. However, a plaintiff would do this at his peril since the Court of Claim's ap-
parent willingness to find an implied in fact contract where the common law would not
seems bottomed on the fact that the plaintiff would have no remedy if the court de-
clined to do so. See id. Where plaintiff has a tort remedy available to him, the Court of
Claims might well insist that the plaintiff pursue that remedy.
16. See note 4 supra, and note 39 infra and accompanying text.
17. Likewise, at common law, not every claim in restitution constituted a tort
claim. Friedman, Restitution, supra note 14, at 504-05. Legal scholars, however, have
urged that a recovery be allowed whenever one person appropriates, uses, or con-
sumes the property of another. Id at 507.
18. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
19. A plaintiff could not sue in the Court of Claims on a contract theory in
such a case because relief for a claim in restitution would sound in quasi-contract. See
note 39 infra. But see note 15 supra.
20. B. Amusement Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 386 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
1981t
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A common example of an eminent domain claim occurs when
the government creates a private nuisance or commits a trespass. In
Speir v. United States," the plaintiff successfully sued on an emi-
nent domain theory where overflights by military helicopters
substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of her land.
There is no doubt that such overflights, if conducted by a private
party, would have been tortious." Had the plaintiff sued the United
States in tort, however, she would have run up against a possible
bar to suit under the FTCA." Accordingly, the plaintiff's only mean-
ingful cause of action would be in eminent domain.
If the tort claim is barred, the plaintiff should also consider
whether the action may be brought as a contract claim since there
are various situations in which a claim may sound in both tort and
contract.2 In addition, the United States Supreme Court has recent-
ly held that the existence of a tort claim which is barred by the
FTCA does not preclude recovery on a contract theory if a valid im-
plied in fact contract exists.2
In determining whether the claim also sounds in contract, the
initial hurdle is overcoming the established rule that if the claim
sounds essentially in tort, then it may not be brought in the Court
of Claims under the Tucker Act by "waiving the tort and suing in
assumpsit.' '" Likewise, a suit brought in a district court under the
FTCA is subject to a motion to dismiss the tort claim if there is a
21. 485 F.2d 643 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
22. S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, 2 AVIATION TORT LAW § 1:8, at 16 (1978).
23. See Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979)(nuisance claims in-
volving aerial bombings on Dept. of Defense lands barred); Schwartz v. United States,
38 F.R.D. 164 (D.N.D. 1965)(tort claim based on damages from sonic boom caused by air
force planes barred).
24. See notes 28-29 infra and accompanying text. When a case sounds in con-
tract, of course, other problems are presented. Unlike claims under the FTCA, federal
law governs contract disputes. See generally American Pipe & Steel Corp. v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961). The contract claim may not
be brought in the local United States district court, but rather, must be brought in the
Court of Claims. Prior to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.
(1976), the Tucker Act permitted the district court to hear contract claims if the
amount in controversy exceeded $10,000.
25. Hatzlachh Supply Co., Inc. v. United States, -U.S.-,100 S. Ct. 647
(1980).
26. See Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1963). This
rule no longer poses an obstacle to plaintiff's suit on a contract theory where the
FTCA bars a tort claim. Hatzlachh Supply Co., Inc. v. United States, __U.S.-,100
S. Ct. 647 (1980). See also note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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strong basis for jurisdiction under the Tucker ActY Some cases,
however, validly may be brought before either court. A well known
case illustrates this point. In Aleutco Corp. v. United States," the
plaintiff corporation bought some surplus property from the United
States. The Government improperly resold some of the property to
a third party and the plaintiff sued in conversion. The Government
contended that the case should have been brought in the Court of
Claims as the case sounded principally in contract. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held that, while the plaintiff had a claim under the
Tucker Act, the claim was also properly brought in tort. 9 The court
explained that prior to the enactment of the FTCA the immunity of
the United States from suit often depended upon making the subtle
distinction between tort and contract. The court was of the view
that this distinction was no longer critical and that no valid policy
objective would be served by denying plaintiff the forum of the
district court.3 0 Unfortunately, some federal courts of appeal have
not taken this liberal view.3'
II. CONTRACT CLAIMS
Contracts may be express or implied. Express contracts be-
tween the government and a private party are beyond the scope of
this article. We deal here with the use or taking of private property
by the federal government where the facts suggest a contract.
There are several problems in dealing with these implied contracts.
First, as seen above,32 many claims which sound in contract also
sound in tort. Perhaps more troublesome, however, is the age-old
difficulty of distinguishing between contracts implied in law and con-
tracts implied in fact. The problem, simply put, is that only con-
tracts implied in fact are cognizable in the Court of Claims under
the Tucker Act. A contract implied in law, or quasi-contract, is a
27. Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291,296 (9th Cir. 1963). See In Re
Bomb Disaster at Roseville, CaL on April 28, 1973, 438 F. Supp. 769,780 (E.D. Cal.
1977)(determination whether claim is for breach of warranty or strict liability in tort
determinative of jurisdiction of district court). Indeed, many attorneys protect
themselves by filing suit in both the district court and the Court of Claims in case one
of those courts should decline jurisdiction. L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
§ 212.0311], at 9-20 (1980).
28. 244 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1957).
29. 1l at 678-79.
30. I& at 679.
31. See, e.g., Blanchart v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 F.2d 351 (5th
Cir. 1965), cert. den, 382 U.S. 829 (1965); United States v. Smith, 324 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.
1963); and cases cited in note 27 supra.
32. See notes 28-30 supra and accompany text.
1981]
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restitutionary remedy for which there may be no relief against the
federal government."
A contract implied in fact is a contract. It is an agreement
based upon a meeting of the minds between the parties. However,
there are two significant analytical differences between a contract
implied in fact and an express contract. First, the contract implied
in fact is evidenced by conduct rather than by words." Second, a dif-
ferent measure of damages may be employed.3 5 In contrast, a con-
tract implied in law is not a real contract at all. Rather, it is a
restitutionary remedy imposed to prevent unjust enrichment. It is a
constructive contract or quasi-contract-a legal fiction-imposed to
provide a remedy.3 6 The Tucker Act provides that the government
has given its consent to suit in contract whether "express or im-
plied."3 The term "implied contract" within the meaning of the
Tucker Act, however, has been construed to apply only to those con-
tracts which are implied in fact. 8 Recovery on a quasi-contract
theory, if it is so denominated, will not be allowed. 9
Consequently, courts occasionally have strained the analytical
distinction between contracts implied in fact and quasi-contracts in
order to find the former and avoid the latter." For example, the
classic situation in which a quasi-contract will be imposed to prevent
unjust enrichment is where an express contract is held invalid."
Some federal courts have stood the law of remedies on its head and
found an implied in fact contract in these circumstances. In the well-
known case of William v. United States,2 an air force officer who
lacked the authority to bind the government contracted to have
33. But see Restitution & Federal Government supra note 4, at 619 & n.155.
34. 2 J. MCBRIDE & I. WACHTEL, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 17.1011] (1978)
[hereinafter cited as MCBRIDE & WACHTEL].
35. See text accompanying note 51 infra.
36. DOBBS. supra note 21, at 235.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 et seq. (1976).
38. See Alabama v. United States, 282 U.S. 502 (1931); United States v. Min-
nesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212 (1926); Merrit v. United States, 267 U.S. 338 (1925).
See also Jankowitz v. United States, 533 F.2d 538 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
39. United States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212 (1926); Merrit v.
United States, 267 U.S. 338 (1925); Knight Newspapers, Inc., v. United States, 395 F.2d
353 (6th Cir. 1968); Algonac Mfg. Co. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1241 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
40. See DOBBS, supra note 13, at 235 n.26 & 993.
41. Id. at 269. Several commentators, however, have urged that restitution in
the context of failed agreements should be classified as a contractual remedy rather
than as an appendage of quasi-contracts. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context
73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208 (1973). C KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 948-49 (1976).
42. 127 F. Supp. 617 (Ct. CI. 1955).
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some road work performed at an installation. The Court of Claims
found an implied in fact contract, but curiously based its analysis on
the fact that the plaintiff had performed its part of the agreement
and had bestowed a benefit on the United States-a quasi-contract
analysis. 3 No real attempt was made to determine the intent of
those persons who did have the authority to bind the government.
The court was content to focus on the equities of plaintiff's claim."
In this respect, the Williams court ignored the long standing rule
that the essential element of an implied in fact contract with the
government is that the agent with whom the plaintiff dealt had the
authority to enter into an express contract involving the same sub-
ject matter. 5
The distinction between contracts implied in fact and contracts
implied in law is likewise blurred where the United States has il-
legally received money from an innocent person. In this situation,
the Court of Claims has routinely implied an obligation on the part
of the United States to return the money. In the leading case of
Kirkendall v. United States, ' the Court of Claims observed:
[Wihen the Government has illegally received the proper-
ty of an innocent citizen and when this money has gone in-
to the Treasury of the United States, there arises an im-
plied contract on the part of the Government to make
restitution to the rightful owner under the Tucker Act,
and this court has jurisdiction to hear the suit.'7
Despite the court's rhetoric, the conclusion is inescapable that the
implied contract found by the court is closer to the restitutionary
remedy of the constructive trust which is impressed to prevent un-
just enrichment than it is to an actual contract.
In most cases where the Court of Claims finds an implied in
fact contract under circumstances where the common law would ap-
43. Restitution & Federal Government, supra note 4, at 612.
44. The court observed, "[s]urely, compelling reasons would be required to
have any court sanction any such inequitable result and we do not think such reasons
exist." 127 F. Supp. at 623.
45. MCBRIDE & WACHTEL, supra note 34, at § 17.10[2]. The Williams court
evaded the problem of the contracting officer's authority by observing that "[i]t seems
incredible that he did not know all about the agreement and by his inaction ratify it.
Certainly he did not repudiate the agreement, and he did not appear as a witness." 127
F. Supp. at 623.
46. 31 F. Supp. 766 (Ct. Cl. 1940). See also Fields v. United States, 423 F.2d
380 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
47. 31 F. Supp. at 769 (citation omitted).
1981]
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ply quasi-contractual analysis, the court, to justify its actions, will
take pains to find the mutual assent necessary for a contract. For
example, in Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States,"s the plain-
tiff had a contract with the United States which violated federal
procurement regulations. Nevertheless, the Court of Claims allowed
the plaintiff recovery on an implied contract theory. In analyzing the
case, the court noted, "while it is clear that the Government could
no longer be bound by [the] terms of the Agreement, it is equally
clear that the Government bargained for, agreed to pay for, and
received the benefit of YPC's services." 9 Apparently the court used
this "agreement" to find an implied in fact contract. One commen-
tator, however, has noted that there was evidence that YPC would
not have entered the contract if the illegal terms had been
excluded. 0 Despite the finding of mutual assent, it is submitted that
the court was really using the "implied in fact contract" as a legal
fiction to do what the court could not do openly-imply a contract in
law to prevent unjust enrichment.
An interesting consequence of the Court of Claim's use of the
"implied in fact contract" is the remedy used. In such cases, the
plaintiff is generally permitted to recover through the common
count of quantum meruit;51 a form of recovery often found in quasi-
contractual relief. Although quantum meruit is often an appropriate
remedy where there has been unjust enrichment, the law of restitu-
tion will not provide that generous a recovery in certain cir-
cumstances.2 For example, if restitution is appropriate because an
48. 582 F.2d 552 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
49. Id. at 560.
50. Casenote, Government Contracts-Illegal Contracts-Jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims to Grant a Quantum Meruit Recovery in Yosemite Park & Curry Co.
v. United States, 582 F.2d 552 (Ct. Cl. 1978) B.Y.U.L. REV. 419 (1979). See also New
York Mail & Newspaper Transp. Co. v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 271 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
den., 355 U.S. 904 (1957)(formation formalities invalidated contract, court found implied
in fact contract).
51. See Sanders Associates, Inc. v. United States, 423 F.2d 291, 299 n.20 (Ct.
Cl. 1970); Restitution & Federal Government supra note 4, at 619.
A recovery in quantum meruit will usually be the value of the services,
measuring value in the labor market. DOBBS, supra note 13, at 237. Quantum meruit is
but one of several common counts. Id. Today, many attorneys use quantum meruit as a
generic term to refer to all the common counts. Some of the other common counts in-
clude: quantum valebant (for the value of goods sold), money paid to the defendant's
use, money had and received, use and occupation of land, and goods sold and delivered.
Id. at 236-38.
52. Professor Perillo has observed that "[r]estitution in contract arises in a
variety of situations, from the defaulting defendant to the defaulting plaintiff, and
justice does not require that the same measure of recovery always be used. Perillo,
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express contract failed, recovery in quantum meruit might give the
plaintiff an unjustifiable windfall. This is true if the failure of the con-
tract was for reasons unassociated with the agreement on the
measure of damages. This is because recovery in quantum meruit
may be far greater than the contract price if the bargain was not a
beneficial one for the plaintiff.
Thus, in some cases, the Court of Claims has used other
methods of fashioning a remedy on finding a contract implied in fact.
In Hughes Transportation Co. v. United States,53 an express con-
tract, in which the plaintiff agreed to transport certain goods, failed
because the rate agreed upon was less than the minimum rate
prescribed by applicable Kentucky law. The Court of Claims found
an implied in fact contract and awarded the plaintiff the minimum
tariff allowed by the state. The court reasoned that there was a real
contract between the parties because the United States intended to
contract with the plaintiff and because "neither party intended to
violate Kentucky law."54 With respect to the remedy, the court
stated that both parties intended that "freight rates lawful under
approved tariffs and Kentucky statutes should apply."' -5
At common law, principles of restitution are generally applied
where an express contract fails for effect. The use of restitution
allows a court to tailor a remedy appropriate to the circumstances.
That, of course, technically cannot be done by the Court of Claims.
Yet, it is suggested that the court did so in the Hughes case. It
strains reason to say, as the court did in Hughes, that the parties in-
tended Kentucky tariffs to apply. It seems clear that the tariff they
intended to apply was that which was provided for in their written
agreement. It is submitted that the United States did not intend to
pay the higher tariff, but that such intent was implied by the court
to prevent unjust enrichment. The court recognized its own sense of
justice when it observed:
[iut would seem unthinkable, in our opinion, that the
federal government which is responsible for the enact-
ment and enforcement of such regulatory statutes as the
Interstate Commerce Act and the Motor Carrier Act,
among others, and which endorses and encourages similar
Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 43 (1981). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 and comments.
53. 121 F. Supp. 212 (Ct. CI. 1954).
54. Id. at 235.
55. Id.
1981]
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regulatory acts on the part of the states in the exercise of
the states' police powers in the same field, should not be
bound by the same statutory limitations on its right of
contract as other shippers and users ... "
Accordingly, the court required the Government to pay the higher
Kentucky tariff since, in the court's view, the Government should
have paid it all along.
Although Hughes indicates the Court of Claim's willingness to
adopt a remedy appropriate to the circumstances, as would a com-
mon law court applying a restitutionary remedy, the Hughes deci-
sion is not a typical case. The Court of Claims generally uses quan-
tum meruit as the remedy applied in implied in fact contract cases. 7
Use of quantum meruit poses the possibility that a plaintiff may
receive a windfall where principles of restitution would afford a
lesser recovery. 8 When a common law court considers a claim in
restitution, it evaluates not only whether the defendant has been
enriched but also whether such enrichment was unjust. 9 An unfor-
tunate consequence of the Court of Claims' manner of granting relief
to a plaintiff on a purported implied in fact theory, in cases which
are really quasi-contractual in nature, is that such an analysis does
not openly consider the justice of the claim, as does an analysis of
unjust enrichment.
For example, in Yosemite,' ° the plaintiff was allowed recovery
despite an illegal contract and evidence that the plaintiff would not
have entered the agreement but for the illegal terms. 1 The court
determined that there was a contract implied in fact and awarded
the plaintiff recovery in quantum meruit. The court reasoned that
because the United States bargained for, agreed to pay for, and
received a benefit over a period during which the plaintiff operated
under the belief that the contract was valid, the United States
should pay for the reasonable value of the benefit.2
56. Ild. at 234.
57. Restitution & Federal Government, supra note 4, at 599, 619-21. See
Sanders Associates v. United States, 423 F.2d 291, 299 n.20 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
58. See note 52 supra and accompanying text. Since it appears, however, that
the Court of Claims is playing games with legal theory in order to prevent unjust
enrichment, the court might not find an implied in fact contract if the resulting remedy
would provide such a windfall.
59. See, e.g., Green Tree Estates v. Furstenberg, 21 Wis. 2d 193, 124 N.W.2d
90 (1963).
60. Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
61. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
62. 582 F.2d at 560.
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If the Yosemite case were to be heard by a Court of Claims em-
powered to give quasi-contractual relief, the court could have bal-
anced the need to provide the plaintiff a remedy against the need to
deter contractors from entering into illegal bargains."'
What explains this unfortunate state of the law? In many cases
the United States is unjustly enriched by the use or taking of pri-
vate property. Analytically, a plaintiff should seek relief in quasi-
contract. However, this type of relief may not be sought against the
United States because of the peculiar jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims. It is suggested that, in spite of this limited jurisdiction,
some federal courts have allowed the action to be brought by find-
ing that a contract implied in fact arose from the transaction, where
to do otherwise would deny the plaintiff recovery despite the unjust
enrichment of the United States. By allowing a recovery in this man-
ner, however, courts have distorted the common law and created a
potential anomaly through which, in certain circumstances, the
Court of Claims might inappropriately provide recovery in quantum
meruit that is in excess of the remedy under traditional principles of
restitution.
An apparent element in a claim on an implied in fact contract is
that the government has received a benefit.' The rationale for this
element of proof seems to be the rule that there is no contract ab-
sent adequate consideration flowing to the government. 5 Not-
withstanding that rationale, before deciding whether there is an im-
plied in fact contract, courts carefully analyze the benefit received
by the government, and measure damages based upon the value of
the benefit." This, of course, is precisely what is done in quasi-
contractual analysis. 7
63. This analysis would not necessarily change the result in Yosemite, it
would only result in giving the court greater flexibility in fashioning a remedy.
64. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 584, cert. den., 292
U.S. 645 (1934). The McBride and Wachtel treatise sets out three elements for implied
in fact contracts:
(1) That the Government agent with whom the party dealt had the
authority to enter into an express contract involving the same subject
matter.
(2) The Government must have received the supplies or services in con-
troversy, or caused them to be used for a public benefit.
(3) The supplies or services for which payment is sought must have been
directly beneficial to the government.
MCBRIDE & WACHTEL supra note 34, at § 17.10[3).
65. See Union National Bank of Chicago v. Weaver, 604 F.2d 543, 545 (7th Cir.
1979).
66. Horton v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 395 (1922).
67. Restitution & Federal Governmen supra note 4, at 612. The cases in
1981]
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It is submitted that a proper analysis of implied in fact con-
tracts would not look to the value of the benefit as long as it had
some value. Of course, every contract must be supported with con-
sideration. It is fundamental, however, that the amount of considera-
tion necessary to support a contract is slight, and that courts do not
often look to the adequacy of the consideration. 8 The courts' preoc-
cupation with the benefit to the government suggests, ironically,
their desire that an "implied in fact" contract not be found where
the government has not been unjustly enriched.
Depending upon the circumstances, a plaintiff may be either
better or worse off because of the peculiar jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims and the technical absence of a restitutionary remedy
against the United States. If the plaintiff can get his claim heard on
an implied in fact contract theory, then the potential exists for re-
covery in excess of what would be possible in restitution. On the
other hand, some claimants may be denied a remedy altogether.
These claimants should consider whether the governmental conduct
was tortious, and if so, whether the FTCA permits suit. Alternative-
ly, the government action might constitute a taking under the fifth
amendment.
III. EMINENT DOMAIN
The fifth amendment provides that no property shall be taken
without just compensation. In spite of this prohibition, there is not a
taking within the meaning of the fifth amendment every time the
government takes or uses private property. The fifth amendment is
directed against the enforcement of an act of the legislature which
authorizes the seizure or destruction of private property against the
will of the owner." Therefore, the law of eminent domain is irrele-
vant if the government and private parties have entered into a con-
tractual relationship."0 Likewise, the law of eminent domain does not
apply to the acts of government officials that are unauthorized by
law, even if the officials purported to act on behalf of the govern-
ment." Rights in these circumstances should be vindicated, respec-
restitution are split as to whether recovery should be the value of the benefit to the
recipient or the market value of the services rendered even if they resulted in a lesser
economic benefit to the recipient. DOBBS, supra note 13, at 255.
68. See, e.g., United States v. American Trading Co., 138 F. Supp. 536 (1956).
See generally I.R. NASH & J. CIBINIC. FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW 136 n.2 (3d ed.
1977).
69. 2 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, § 6.1 (1976).
70. I&
71. Id.
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tively, through contract and tort claims."2 Eminent domain, there-
fore, does not create a positive right in the individual to receive
compensation from the government whenever his property is taken
for public use.73 On the other hand, there is no need that the
government take property under formal eminent domain procedures
in order for an eminent domain suit to lie.7' Suits on a constructive
eminent domain claim are well recognized."'
A taking under the fifth amendment must have been an inten-
tional appropriation of the property to public use. An unintentional
taking, of course, may be compensable if it constitutes a tort, but it
is not an exercise of eminent domain. Similarly, where the United
States and a private party contracted for the government to have
the use or benefit of property, there is no taking within the law of
eminent domain." Should some dispute arise with respect to the con-
tract, therefore, it cannot be said that there was a taking without
just compensation. Rather, there is simply a contract dispute be-
tween the parties which should be dealt with under the Tucker Act.
Courts do not apply the law of eminent domain if a claimant
may obtain relief through resort to some other legal theory." This
appears at first blush to be nothing more than the traditional pref-
erence of courts to avoid basing decisions on constitutional
grounds." Unfortunately, the courts do not state that this is the
rule. Rather, the courts analyze the facts of a case in light of the
elements of eminent domain. Thus, if the facts suggest that the Gov-
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. This article does not deal with the scope of eminent domain, and the ex-
tent to which government action, i.e.. regulation, which is a proper exercise of the
police power, might amount to a taking. It is settled, of course, that some interference
with private property may be justifiable under the police power, and would not
amount to a taking under the fifth amendment. Id. at § 6.1.
75. See United States v. Dickenson, 331 U.S. 745 (1946).
76. Vansant v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 562, 566 (1932).
77. PDTC Owner's Ass'n. v. Coachella Valley Cty. Water, 443 F. Supp. 338,
342 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 707 (Ct. Cl.
1955); Vansant v. United States, 75 Ct.Cl. 562, 566 (1932).
78. Consolidated Coal v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 608, appeal dismissed, 270
U.S. 664 (1926); Klebe v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 160 (1922), aff'd, 263 U.S. 188 (1923).
79. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 716, 572 F.2d 786 (1978).
80. The Supreme Court originally viewed "constructive eminent domain" as a
suit against the United States on an implied in fact contract theory. See Tempel v.
United States, 248 U.S. 121 (1918). Now, however, it is well settled that all eminent do-
main claims are under the Constitution. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933),
quoted in, Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 816 (1948).
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ernment had some colorable claim to the property, the court will
determine that there was no taking. Where a contract, whether ex-
press or implied was entered into by the government, whether or
not enforceable, it is clear that the government did not intend to
take property as.an exercise of eminent domain. However, when this
reasoning is applied to a situation where no contract developed be-
tween the plaintiff and the United States, it can result in a bar to
relief, despite the fact that the government has been enriched by
the use or taking of private property.
In J.J. Henry Co. v. United States,81 the Navy had a contract
with a prime contractor to build a ship. The plaintiff, a subcontrac-
tor, was hired by the prime contractor to develop plans for the new
ship. The subcontractor did the work and turned over the plans. The
prime contractor, as per its contract with the United States, turned
over the plans to the Navy. Subsequently, the prime contractor
breached its contract with the United States, and never paid the
subcontractor for the work performed. The United States, however,
continued to use the plans developed by the plaintiff, which were
turned over to the new prime contractor for use in the develop-
ment of the ship. The plaintiff sued in the Court of Claims on an
eminent domain theory for the value of the plans. The court held
that this was not a taking under the fifth amendment because the
United States was entitled to the plans under the terms of its con-
tract with the prime contractor.2 The court observed:
[tihe clear thrust of authorities is that where the govern-
ment possesses property under the color of legal right, as
by an express contract, there is seldom a taking in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. The amendment has limited
application to the relative rights in property of parties
litigant which have been voluntarily created by contract.'
The determination that eminent domain was inappropriate denied
the plaintiff a remedy, as the court noted in dictum that there was
no implied in fact contract either.u Henry, therefore, illustrates the
possibility that a plaintiff may have no recovery despite the unjust
enrichment of the United States.
Where the United States and the complaining party had a
meeting of the minds and thus a contract, whether express or im-
81. 411 F.2d 1246 (Ct. C1. 1969).
82. Id. at 1249.
83. IM
84. I& at 1250.
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plied in fact, it is easy to see that the case should be brought as a
contract claim rather than under eminent domain. It is also
reasonable, where the government has engaged in tortious conduct,
to expect a plaintiff to proceed in tort, rather than eminent domain,
if the FTCA permits. Indeed, this is no more than a restatement of
the rule that courts should avoid deciding cases on constitutional
grounds. Where, however, the government takes or uses property
under circumstances where the contract cannot be found, or where
the tort claim is not cognizable under the FTCA, a different situa-
tion is presented. In these cases, a plaintiff may be unable to obtain
any form of relief if his case is not cognizable in eminent domain.
This is so, since actions which sound exclusively in unjust enrich-
ment may not be brought against the United States. 5
In Henry," the court denied eminent domain relief relying on
the fact the the government had a claim of right to the plans under
its contract with the prime contractor, and therefore, did not "take"
anything from the plaintiff in the constitutional sense. If the plain-
tiff had contracted with the United States, the court's reasoning
would make sense-the United States would have obtained the
plaintiff's plans under color of right; and the plaintiff would have
had a contract claim against the government. Even if the express
contract failed for effect, he might have proved an implied.in fact
contract. 7 However, the court determined that there was no con-
tract, either express or implied, between the plaintiff and the
United States. If that was so, then why did the United States have a
claim of right to the property of Henry? The prime contractor was
not entitled to the plans because he did not pay Henry for them, and
he could not contract to sell what was not his to the United States.
It is submitted that the Henry case was wrongly decided. The
government knew or should have known that it was taking private
property without just compensation. When the court determined
that Henry did not have a valid contract claim with the United
States, and thus could not proceed on a contract theory, it should
have allowed recovery in eminent domain. Nor should it matter
whether the government officials who authorized the use of Henry's
plans without compensating him had a good faith belief that the
plans were the property of the government. Eminent domain cases
have applied an objective standard in dealing with the intent of the
85. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text.
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government. The absence of a subjective intent to take should not
defeat a claim in eminent domain."
In any event, it now appears that the Court of Claims has aban-
doned the approach followed in Henry, although it has not expressly
overruled that case. In the recent case of Heinemann v. United
States," the plaintiff sought recovery in eminent domain for the
value of a patent taken by the United States. The Government de-
fended on the grounds that it was acting on a claim of right arising
from an assignment, which it believed to be valid. The court stated
[diefendant's argument is premised on the ancient claim of
righ-t doctrine. This doctrine arose and is applicable to the
confract-based jurisdiction of the court. The gist of the
doctrine is that no implied promise by the United States
to pay compensation for its taking possession of or for its
using property can be found where it is acting under a
claim of right to possess or use the property. Here,
however, plaintiff is not alleging that an implied promise
or contract is the source of the defendant's obligation to
compensate him for its having used the '381 invention.
Plaintiffs claim is that the Fifth Amendment obligates
defendant to pay him compensation and that the amend-
ment attaches to the defendant whether or not defendant
has intended to take or has believed that it is taking prop-
erty belonging to another. That a taking without just com-
pensation of property belonging to another is a taking
under the Fifth Amendment whether or not the United
States intends to take or believes that it is taking proper-
ty belonging to another is a proposition which has been af-
firmed by this court.9"
Whether a case sounds in eminent domain may turn on wheth-
er the government agent who took or used the property was acting
intentionally. Thus, if the government action constitutes an inten-
tional tort which cannot be brought under the FTCA, 1 the key ele-
ment of an eminent domain suit is satisfied. If, however, the govern-
88. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 315 F.2d 378 (Ct. Cl. 1963)(er-
roneous survey by government surveyor resulting in accidentally depriving Indians of
land is a taking despite absence of intent to take, and good faith conduct by surveyor).
89. 620 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
90. Id. at 879. (citing Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 315 F.2d 378
(Ct. Cl. 1963)).
91. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
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ment agent was merely negligent, then the plaintiff may have no
grounds for relief under eminent domain since "[ajn accidental or
negligent impairment of the value of property is not a taking but. at
most, a tort."92 If suit on the tort is not permitted by the FTCA, then,
the plaintiff cannot recover notwithstanding that the government
might have been unjustly enriched by the transaction.
There are many cases in which the government has been un-
justly enriched by the use or taking of private property but, for one
reason or another, suit cannot be brought on either a contract or a
tort theory. Furthermore, in many of these cases, it will not appear
that the government agent either intended to take the property, or
even, perhaps, intended to perform an act a natural consequence of
which is the taking or use of private property. In these cir-
cumstances, perhaps out of an unspoken motive of preventing the
United States from being unjustly enriched, many courts will per-
form the bizarre feat of finding a government agent's "intent to
take" by implication. The case of Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United
States93 illustrates the reasoning typically articulated to justify such
a finding. In Sioux Tribe, a government surveyor negligently per-
formed a survey to divide Indian land from federal land. The survey
deprived the Sioux of certain lands and the tribe sued on an emi-
nent domain theory. The Government defended with the contention
that the surveyor's acts were at most negligent, and in no event
rose to the level of an intentional taking. The court rejected that
view stating:
[aplthough it might be said that there was no intentional
appropriation of these lands, there was, nevertheless, a
taking under the Fifth Amendment. Under earlier opin-
ions of the Supreme Court, it was said that it was
necessary, to support a judgment for the taking of proper-
ty by the United States, that there be a promise, express
or implied, to pay for the land taken .... It is the taking
and the failure to pay just compensation that gives rise to
the cause of action. 94
92. Vansant v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 562, 566 (1932). The recent case of
Heinemann v. United States, 620 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1980), however, suggests a will-
ingness on the part of the Court of Claims to allow some eminent domain claims where
the government has been negligent. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text. See
also Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 315 F.2d 378 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
93. 315 F.2d 378 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
94. Id at 379 (citations omitted).
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It is submitted that in the cases where the reasoning artic-
ulated above is applied, no subjective intent on the part of the
government to pay for the benefit bestowed can realistically be
found. Rather, the court implies such an intent to pay in order to
prevent unjust enrichment. 5
CONCLUSION
Serious legal problems are presented when a plaintiff seeks
relief from the United States when the latter has been unjustly en-
riched. The long standing rule, that no action in restitution will lie
against the United States, bars claims which are so denominated.
However, the rule has had another consequence. Perhaps, in an ef-
fort to mitigate the harshness of the sovereign immunity doctrine,
federal courts have construed the law of contracts, and eminent do-
main, to grant relief to a plaintiff on those theories, where, but for
the sovereign immunity bar, he would recover on a claim for restitu-
tion.
It is submitted, that, to accomplish this goal, federal courts
have had to intentionally misapply basic principles of contract law.
A contract implied in fact is a contract while a quasi-contract is not
a contract, but rather, a remedy to prevent unjust enrichment.
Nevertheless, careful analysis of cases in which the Court of Claims
has found a "contract implied in fact" reveals that in many cases no
implied in fact contract existed at all. In many of those same cases,
a common law court would have found a quasi-contract. It is sug-
gested that the Court of Claims found the "implied in fact" contract
not because there really was one, but because that court's sense of
justice mandated that there be a remedy to prevent the unjust en-
richment of the United States in those circumstances.
How do the courts perform this contract-law hat trick? One
basic requirement of a contract is that there be a meeting of the
95. The manner in which the Court of Claims finds an "intent" to take on the
part of the government which does not in fact subjectively exist in order to establish
eminent domain is very similar to the way they will find an "intent" to pay needed to
find a contract implied in law. See notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text.
In this context, the recent case of Heinemann v. United States, 620 F.2d 874
(Ct. Cl. 1980), see notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text, is also significant. In
Heinemann, the government apparently had a good faith, but erroneous, belief that
they were entitled to a patent under a valid license. That court said that there was a
fifth amendment taking "whether or not the United States intends to take or believes
that it is taking property belonging to another." Id. at 879. Accordingly, the court im-
plied a promise to pay from the circumstances, and thus, found a fifth amendment tak-
ing.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1982], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss2/2
REMEDIES
minds. Thus, contract law will focus on the intention of the parties,
and examine their objective manifestations of intent." It appears,
however, that the Court of Claims in the process of implying con-
tracts in fact also implies that the parties were subscribing to a cer-
tain standard of conduct. Thus the court focuses on what the parties
should have been manifesting and not what they were actually do-
ing. Thus, in Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States,97 the
court ignored all of the evidence that the parties would not have
contracted but for the illegal terms in the contract, and analyzed the
parties intent as if their conduct had been consistently proper.
Similarly, in Williams v. United States," the court disregarded the
absence of assent by the contracting officer and treated the facts as
if the contracting officer had known of the facts and ratified the ar-
rangement. In short, the Court of Claims seems willing to strain the
facts of a case beyond credulity, or to find by implication that the
parties maintained a fair and reasonable standard of conduct.
Through this approach, plaintiffs are often able to recover for claims
which seem very much like claims sounding in restitution.
It is submitted that courts play the same "game" with respect
to the "intent" element of claims in eminent domain. It is well
established that the government must intend to take property, or at
least intend an act the probable consequence of which is a taking for
there to be a fifth amendment claim. In spite of that requirement,
the courts will often imply the intent if necessary to avoid unjust
enrichment.
In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States,"' the court implied
an intent to take Indian lands from the fact that a surveyor had
been careless, and the carelessness resulted in the tribe being
deprived of some property. Clearly, the surveyor did not intend to
survey improperly. Yet, the court knew that the plaintiff had no
other cause of action, and that the government had been unjustly
enriched.
It has been suggested that the Tucker Act be amended to allow
claims in restitution to be brought against the United States.1 " This
96. Thus, at common law, a promise made in jest will be enforceable if the
promisee did not know the promisor was jesting, and the expression would be
reasonably understood to mean what it appeared to mean. Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va.
493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954).
97. 582 F.2d 552 (Ct. Cl. 1978), see notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
98. 127 F. Supp. 617 (Ct. Cl. 1955), see notes 42-45 supra and accompanying
text.
99. 315 F.2d 378 (Ct. Ci. 1963), see notes 93-95 supra and accompanying text.
100. Restitution & Federal Government, supra note 4, at 622-25.
19811
Vitaris: Remedies Against the United States for Private Property Used or T
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1982
276 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 16
author indorses that proposal. In the meantime, plaintiffs must con-
tinue to walk delicately when confronted with a claim for restitu-
tion. The plaintiff should always first consider possible tort or im-
plied in fact contract theories since courts will not entertain an emi-
nent domain claim when other remedies are available.' 1 If, after con-
sidering tort or contract remedies, and overcoming the obstacle of
selecting the right court, 102 the plaintiff feels there is no tort or con-
tract cause of action, he should consider a claim in eminent domain.
101. See notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
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